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Abstract
Prior research has proposed technical solutions to use peer-to-peer
(P2P) content delivery to serve Internet video, showing that it can re-
duce costs to content providers. Yet, suchmethods have not become
widespread except for a few niche instances. An important chal-
lenge is incentivization: what tangible benefits does P2P content
delivery offer users who bring resources to the table? In this paper,
we ask whether monetary incentives can help attract peers in P2P
content delivery systems. We commissioned a professional survey
of people around the United States to answer several relevant ques-
tions. We found that 51% of the 876 respondents—substantially
larger than our expectations—answered “yes” to whether they
would participate for suitable financial incentives. Encouraged by
the results of the survey, we propose Gringotts, a system to struc-
ture incentives and securely incorporate P2P delivery into content
delivery systems. Gringotts provides a novel Proof of Delivery
mechanism that allows content providers to verify correct delivery
of their files, and shows how to use cryptocurrency to pay peers
while guarding against liars and Sybil attacks.
1 Introduction
Video streams constitute over 70% of global Internet traffic [6, 28].
Most video is delivered to users today via Content Distribution
Networks (CDNs) like Akamai and CloudFlare. Although CDN
demand has nearly doubled since 2016 [6], they are too expensive
for many content providers [26].
To combat these high prices, there have been many proposals
to have peers cache and stream videos to each other, either as
supplements to existing CDNs [39, 38, 35], or as decentralized
P2P systems [22, 29]. For example, peers within an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) in a city could stream videos directly to
one another, avoiding expensive Internet paths. By serving content
using bandwidth and storage resources that would otherwise go
unused, such systems could significantly reduce costs for content
providers and CDN operators.
These proposals have not seen significant adoption in practice
because of a lack of sufficient participation [4, 39]. Even forms of
incentivization like virtual tokens and in-service perks (e.g., traffic
prioritization) have failed to attract enough peers [29, 23, 24]. We
believe that the steady increases in uplink bandwidth and storage
capacity on laptops [30] motivate revisiting P2P content delivery,
but with a focus on secure payments as an incentive mechanism.
We ask two questions. First, would users be willing to participate
in such a system if theywere incentivizedwithmonetary payments?
To answer this question, we commissioned a consumer survey to
understand user concerns with respect to participation in P2P con-
tent delivery (§2). Our key finding is that 51% of the 876 users
would participate. We were pleasantly surprised by this percentage,
which is larger than what we expected. Those who would not
participate were primarily concerned with device security, content
liability, and impacts on device performance. To our knowledge,
the results we report are the first published findings on this question.
Second, how can payments for monetary incentivization be
done securely? This is challenging for several reasons. First, a
content provider cannot be trusted to honor payments, and peers
may be disinclined to share payment credentials with certain
content providers. Second, existing centralized payment systems
(e.g., Paypal) are not designed to support the large number of small
transactions that would be needed for P2P content delivery. This
is particularly challenging because peers and content providers can
span geographic boundaries that impose foreign transaction/ex-
change fees. Further, these issues are more pronounced for small
content providers, both due to financial limitations and difficulties
in convincing peers of faithful payments.
One approach to address these challenges is to use a central au-
thority that everyone trusts (e.g., a bank) to enforce content delivery
payments. An alternative approach is to eliminate the use of a cen-
tral authority (and the associated trust requirements), and to instead
provide the above guarantees in a completely decentralizedmanner.
With either approach, content providers must be assured that deliv-
ery is happening properly. Our primary contribution is a lightweight
solution to this problem in which content providers, clients, and
peers, collectively produce a Proof of Delivery Chain (PoDC) that
serves as a proof for the delivery of a file from a set of peers to a
client. PoDCs are unforgeable and tamper-proof: neither the peers
nor the content providers can manipulate them to affect payments.
We present the design of Gringotts, a system that applies
PoDC to decentralized P2P content delivery. Payments in
Gringotts are made using a cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrencies
naturally address some of the aforementioned challenges, and our
consumer survey revealed that 27% of users are already willing
to accept cryptocurrency payments (with 40% unsure due to
lack of familiarity). In Gringotts, peers are ensured payments by
broadcasting PoDCs on a blockchain. Gringotts uses probabilistic
payments to limit blockchain transaction overheads without
compromising security. Gringotts is also robust to various forms
of collusion (e.g., clients and content providers, clients and peers)
and Sybil attacks with fake clients or peers.
2 Consumer Survey
To understand the expectations and requirements for user participa-
tion in a peer-to-peer content delivery service, we commissioned a
third-party professional organization to undertake a consumer sur-
vey. They survey garnered 876 responses from around the United
States. The respondents ranged in age, with 95% between the ages
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Figure 1: Key consumer survey findings.
Concern Fraction concerned
Security and Privacy 82.8%
Liability for Illegal Content 50.5%
Performance Impact on Device 47.1%
Payment Concerns 42.1%
Personal Ethics 29.4%
Table 1: Concerns for users who specified that they would not
participate in the service.
Concern Fraction concerned
Don’t Know How to Use/Sell 59.7%
Not Setup to Receive 54.7%
Volatility and Risk 49.1%
Don’t KnowWhat it is 21.9%
Other 6.9%
Table 2: Concerns for users who specified that they would not be
willing to accept payment in cryptocurrency.
of 18-60; 52% of the participants were female; annual household in-
comes were distributed between $10K-200K+, with 45% between
$25K-$100K. Each participant was asked a set of 11 questions, re-
lating to payments, resource availability, and participation concerns.
Our key findings are:
• 51% of users said they would participate.
• Of those who would participate, 70% expect to earn no more
than 50% of their monthly Internet bill.
• 27% of users are willing to accept payment in the form
of cryptocurrency; 40% were unsure about cryptocurrency
payments, while 33% were unwilling.
• The largest concerns for users who would not participate were
security and privacy concerns (83%), liability concerns over
content (50%), and impact on device performance (47%).
Feasibility of participation. To glean information about the
potential for successful user participation, we asked users about
the devices they have to store/serve content, the free storage space
of those devices, and the amount of time they would use those
devices in the service. 83% of users owned a laptop, and 82%
of laptop owners reported free storage space of more than 20
GB. To put these numbers into context, consider that storing an
average YouTube video that supports 5 bitrates requires 200 MB
of space.1 Peers with more than 20 GB of free storage can store
1We obtained this number by scraping multiple reference videos with the
youtube-dl tool [36]. Reference videos were chosen to represent the average
YouTube video length of 4 minutes [19].
more than 100 average videos. Further, consider that the average
uplink capacity in the US is 22 Mbits/s [21]. Streaming HD video
requires an average of 5 Mbits/s throughput [20], suggesting that
peers should be able to stream up to 4 HD videos in parallel.
Experiments with an Apache web server reveal that mean and peak
CPU utilization (single core) are 0.36% and 13%, respectively,
when serving 4 concurrent HD videos. These numbers mildly
increase to 1.7% and 33% for 16 concurrent video streams.2
The remaining considerations are daily participation times and
earnings for peers. 65% of laptop owners in our survey stated
that they use their computers for more than 2 hours a day. Serving
content for 2 hours a day on a 22 Mbits/s link amounts to 580
GB of data served per month. If we assume that peers earn
$0.05/GB [3], they will make $29 per month, which is greater than
the requirement of covering half of their monthly Internet costs
(the average US plan costs $50 per month [12]). We note that these
numbers are conservative as 66% of users would keep their laptops
on for longer times, even when not in use, to serve (and earn) more.
Concerns. Figure 1a shows that 49% of users would not participate
in the service. Table 1 lists the concerns shared by those users.
As shown, a significant fraction of users were concerned about
the impact that the service would have on their device, both with
respect to security and privacy, and device/network performance.
Thus, a practical deployment must ensure that service components
running on user devices are sufficiently isolated from the rest of
the host device, and are capped in terms of resources consumption.
Many users would not participate due to content liability concerns,
stemming equally from ethical considerations, legality, and
privacy. Consequently, the majority of users were willing to serve
movies/shows/news, but only 11% were willing to serve adult
content. These preferences promote distributed content filtering,
and the inclusion of content information to the contracts between
peers and content providers.
The other primary user concern was with respect to payments.
27% of respondents were willing to accept payments in cryptocur-
rency, 40% were unsure, and 33% were against it (Figure 1b).
Additional questions revealed that users were predominantly
concerned with lack of familiarity with cryptocurrencies. Table 2
shows that many users did not support cryptocurrency payment
because they either did not know how to use/sell them, or they were
not setup to receive them. Further, a significant fraction of users
were concerned with the volatility and risk of cryptocurrencies. We
expect these numbers to decrease in the upcoming years as the use
of cryptocurrencies grows, and more advanced cryptocurrencies
are created. However, these results do motivate the exploration
of secure alternative payment forms.
3 Secure and Practical Decentralized
Incentivization
In this section, we describe how content delivery and payments are
handled in Gringotts. We present solutions to the security vulnera-
bilities that arise from using decentralized monetary incentivization,
2Experiments were performed on a Desktop machine that has an Intel Xeon
CPU with a 2.80 GHz processor.
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Figure 2: Downloading a file with Gringotts.
and discuss several practical overhead considerations.
3.1 Overview
Gringotts includes three major entities: a content provider that
generates content (e.g., videos), a client who requests that content,
and a peer who serves that content. To start, the content provider
creates a Smart Contract for each content file that they would
like to distribute. The Smart Contract includes information about
payments, describing howmuch peers will earn by serving this file,
where payments will come from (i.e., the content providers cryp-
tocurrency account), and the rules that peers must follow to prove
that they served a file for payment (i.e., Proof of Delivery (PoD)).
Files are broken into chunks, and each chunk is placed on multiple
peers who agree to the content provider’s terms for that file.
Figure 2 illustrates how Gringotts handles a client request
for a single file. Client requests are initially forwarded to the
content provider, who responds with an Initial Certificate (IC) that
provides a guide on how to download all of the file’s constituent
chunks. The IC includes a list specifying the peer (identified by IP
address and public key) to download each chunk from, along with
the address of a Backup Node, which is a trusted server (e.g., a
traditional CDN) to contact in the event that a peer is unreachable.
Backup Nodes operate identically to normal peers, generating a
PoD for each request that they serve.3 The content provider signs
each IC with its private key to prevent forgery.
Upon receiving an IC, the client begins to download chunks
from the listed peers. Clients maintain a sequential chain of
PoD entries for each chunk they download, called the PoD chain
(PoDC). The first element in the chain is the IC served by the
content provider. After each successful chunk download, the client
sends the peer a hash of the current PoDC. The peer then generates
a new PoD (for the chunk they served) by signing the hash with
its private key. The peer commits this PoD to the Blockchain, and
also sends it to the client, which adds it to the PoDC. Thus, at the
end of the file download, the Blockchain contains the entire PoDC
for the file download. The PoDC effectively acts as a Blockchain,
in that every link in the chain can be verified by a third party to
ensure that the Smart Contract is not violated.
For simplicity, we described the client’s downloading of chunks
to be serial. This ensures sequential PoDs in the PoDC, which
3To generate PoDs, Backup Nodes can be deployed on programmable CDNs
like Amazon CloudFront [2], which can execute arbitrary computations on each
incoming request.
is necessary for third party verification. However, for improved
performance, chunks for a file can be downloaded in parallel
streams, such that each stream generates an independent PoDC
comprised of chunks that are downloaded serially.
3.2 Overheads
Content Provider Overheads. With Gringotts, every client file
request is first forwarded to the content provider which generates
an IC for the download. This overhead mimics that of a video
download with a traditional CDN. Clients traditionally begin a
video streaming session by first downloading a Manifest file di-
rectly from the content provider; video content is then downloaded
directly from CDNs [17]. In fact, with Gringotts, content providers
can simply append ICs directly to Manifest files. Manifest files can
be further modified to include hash values for each chunk in the
file, allowing clients to verify the integrity of the data they receive.
Blockchain Overheads. In the design presented in §3.1, each
chunk download is recorded on the Blockchain by the corre-
sponding peer. This transactional overhead may overwhelm the
Blockchain. For example, 50,000 YouTube videos are watched
every second, but existing Blockchains like Ethereum [34] can
only support 25 transactions per second.
To limit the overhead on the Blockchain, we propose using
probabilistic payments. A simple approach is for content providers
to grant payments only for a PoD which is divisible by a number
N (specified in the Smart Contract). Peers would only submit a
PoD to the Blockchain if this condition is met. Thus, reducing
the number of Blockchain transactions by a factor of N.
One challenge with probabilistic payments is that the PoDC will
no longer be directly recoverable from the Blockchain, since not
all PoD entries will be present. However, the PoDC is necessary
to verify that a PoD is valid, i.e., that it corresponds to a file
delivery that adhered to the rules specified by the Smart Contract.
To overcome this, peers can request the current PoDC from the
client each time they generate a payment-eligible PoD. The peer
can then include the PoDC in its Blockchain entry. It is important
to note that PoDC transactions only occur once every N chunk
downloads. Further, we expect the size of each PoD to be several
bytes, implying PoDC sizes under a few KB.
Setting the value of N for probabilistic payments entails a
tradeoff: a large N implies low payment frequency, while a low
N limits the savings on Blockchain transaction costs. Assume that
N is selected such than an active peer gets paid (on average) 10
times per day, or 300 times per month. We make two observations.
First, given that existing Blockchains like Ethereum can handle 2.2
million transactions per day, Gringotts would be able to support
220,000 active peers at any time. Second, payment frequencies
are relatively stable. Specifically, the number of payments per
month will be Binomial distributed, with a mean of 300 and a
standard deviation of 17.3. Of course, the appropriate value of
N will change over time, as new Blockchains are created. For
example, Algorand [10] claims to support 100x more throughput
(and thus users) than Ethereum.
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3.3 Detecting and Thwarting Attacks
Using monetary incentivization in decentralized settings has
inherent security risks. For example, any involved entity (content
provider, peer, or client) can be independently malicious, and
entities can collude to perform even more complex attacks. In this
section, we primarily focus on financially-motivated attacks, but
we also discuss other common attacks (e.g., DoS attacks).
3.3.1 Single-entity Attacks
Malicious peer. To get paid, a peer must generate a PoD that is
payment-eligible according to the Smart Contract. However, a
malicious peer could attempt to generate a PoD without serving
content to a client. Preventing such an attack in Gringotts is
relatively straightforward. Recall that a peer generates a PoD using
a hash of the PoDC that is provided by a client. If a malicious peer
does not serve a chunk, the client can simply refuse to provide
a PoDC hash (and subsequently download the chunk from the
Backup Node). Further, since peers only learn the PoDC hash after
serving a chunk, they cannot selectively choose to only service
requests that will lead to a payment.
Malicious content provider. A content provider’s goal is to max-
imize content distribution while minimizing cost. Since a content
provider does not know a peer’s private key (which is used to
generated a PoD) in advance, it cannot predict what a PoD will
look like with a new IC. However, a malicious content provider
could generate ICs which have resulted in no payments to a peer
during past downloads. To prevent this, ICs can be augmented to
include a nonce, which serves as a unique identifier for each IC.
Each content provider’s nonces must be monotonically increasing
(e.g., timestamps), and clients must include the appropriate nonce
in each chunk request that they send a peer (i.e., Step 3 in Figure 2).
In this way, peers can verify that incoming chunk requests are not
intentionally designed to prevent payment by reusing a nonce value.
There is one complication with having peers verify that nonces
are monotonically increasing. Given the decentralized nature of
Gringotts, client network latencies can create race conditions for
nonce verification at peers. For example, consider a scenario in
which two clients simultaneously request a file from a content
provider such that the difference in their nonce values is one unit.
The first client’s network delay to load the first n chunks could
be greater than the corresponding delay for the second client,
creating a scenario where the second client’s request for chunk
n+1 reaches the appropriate peer before that of the first client.
To handle such scenarios, peers can maintain a sliding window
of past nonce values. Incoming nonce values cannot match those
in the window, and must be larger than the nonce value received
immediately prior to the start of the window.
3.3.2 Collusion Attacks
Collusion between clients and content providers. As noted
above, a malicious content provider may want to prevent peers
from receiving payments. While monotonically increasing nonces
prevent the attack when a content provider acts alone, they are
insufficient when content providers collude with clients. Specifi-
cally, a client (on behalf of a content provider) could fail to provide
a PoDC to a peer that generates a payment-eligible PoD. Peers
can certainly detect such behavior, and immediately stop serving
content on behalf of the corresponding content provider. However,
this poses a payment issue: peers receive probabilistic payments, so
simply halting service for a content provider can yield significant
amounts of wasted, uncompensated work. One way to mitigate
this is for peers to request PoDC values from clients after every
chunk they serve, rather than only doing so after they generate a
payment-eligible PoD. In this way, peers would be able to quickly
detect malicious clients. However, this solution adds significant
bandwidth upload overheads to well-behaved clients. Instead,
peers should probabilistically request PoDC values from clients. If
the probability of requesting a PoDC is higher than the probability
that a peer receives a payment for a chunk download, peers can
identify malicious behavior without wasting significant resources.
Collusion between clients and peers (Sybil attack). In an effort
to increase payments, peers can collude with clients to lie about
content delivery, thereby earning money without expending any
resources. As a first step towards prevention, Gringotts’s content
providers randomize the peers that are responsible for serving
the chunks of a file, making it difficult for a colluding client to
contact a colluding peer. However, this is insufficient since the
cost of creating a client is zero. A malicious peer can spawn a
large number of clients to ensure that a significant number of
clients contact it. In this model, each malicious client can generate
a PoD for the first chunk in a file if it is intended to be served by
a colluding peer; otherwise, the client can terminate the connection
without wasting any resources.
Unfortunately, existing anomaly detection approaches to prevent
collusion are unable to detect such attacks [1]. Instead, Gringotts
enforces that the first chunk in each file is downloaded from a
secure, trusted node (e.g., a traditional CDN). This modification
creates an overhead to client generation, since a clientmust expend
bandwidth resources to download the first chunk of a file, before
they can download subsequent chunks of the file from peers
hoping to earn money. This overhead, in turn, makes Sybil attacks
economically unfeasible.
To better understand this solution, consider a file download
in which download bandwidth costs peers $x per chunk, content
providers pay $y per chunk download (on average), and peer
upload costs are $z per chunk. Further, assume that the fraction
of malicious peers owning the chunks of that file is m, and the
file comprises l chunks. If peers and clients collude, the expected
cost for a client to download the file up to chunk i is,
Cost[i] = 1·x+(i−1)·(m·0+(1−m)·x) (1)
This equation states that the first chunk will be downloaded from
a secure node (costing x). Additionally, if the remaining i− 1
chunks are routed to peers with equal probability, then a fraction
m of these chunks will be downloaded with zero cost, while
the remaining chunks will be downloaded from honest peers.
Similarly, the expected value of payments to a malicious peer for
the file download until chunk i is,
Payment[i]=(i−1)·m·y (2)
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The attack can be deemed economically unfeasible if the cost
to the colluding client is greater than the payments received by
the malicious peer, or,
Payment[i]< Cost[i], ∀i∈N
=⇒ y≤ x
(
1
m
−1
)
(3)
Further, to make the system monetarily feasible for peers, their
compensation ($y) should be greater than the bandwidth costs of
uploading a chunk. This enforces an additional constraint
y > z (4)
These constraints bound payments based on the fraction of
malicious peers serving the chunks in a file. For example, if the
payment for a file is twice that of the download cost, then more
than 33% of the peers holding the chunks for that file must collude
to make the attack economically feasible.
Can a malicious peer spawn a large number of colluding peers
to achieve high values ofm for a particular file? Such an attack
is unfeasible as a colluding peer will have to respond to requests
from well-behaved clients, consuming peer bandwidth. Failing
to respond to these requests can be easily detected by existing
anomaly detection techniques. We do note, however, that the above
approach works only if content providers ensure randomization
of peer selection for chunk downloads and content providers
periodically mandate churn in the list of peers considered for a
given file. Otherwise, a small number of malicious peers might
still potentially achieve a high value form.
Finally, a key property of the proposed solution is that it does
not impose any overhead on well-behaved clients, as bandwidth
is only used to download chunks in the requested file. However,
requiring that the first chunk of each file is downloaded from a
trusted node reduces the potential savings of using peer resources
for content delivery, since infrastructure-backed nodes must now
serve 1/l fraction of overall traffic.
3.3.3 Non-financial Attacks
Malicious client. Though clients are not involved in the financial
aspects of content delivery, they can still perform attacks on the
system. Most notably, a group of malicious clients can perform
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on a content provider by failing
to support payments to peers for serving that content provider’s
chunks. Peers that detect such behavior can decide to not serve the
content provider’s files, preventing content distribution. However,
peers can only detect that a client is preventing payments after
serving a chunk and requesting a PoDC from the client. A PoDC
is requested with probability p for each chunk download, implying
that a client will have to download 1/p chunks from a peer before
receiving a request for a PoDC. Since p is intentionally kept to
small values, the client will have to expend significant bandwidth
resources (downloading chunks) in order to carry out such a DoS
attack, making it impractical.
4 Performance and Availability
Beyond secure incentivization, a decentralized CDN must perform
numerous tasks to meet the requirements of content providers. In
particular, providers expect their content to quickly be available
to clients at all times. In this section, we outline how content
providers can achieve these goals within Gringotts.
4.1 File Placement
With Gringotts, content providers must decide what peers serve
their content. While the previous section discusses the security
implications of file placement decisions, there are other factors
which content providers will likely consider. In addition to
supporting prior P2P file placement strategies [23, 38], Gringotts
provides content providers with more flexibility in influencing
content delivery pricing and performance.
Availability. Content providers must ensure that their files are
available to their clients at all times, even in times of high demand.
To do this, content providers must ensure that their files are hosted
on a sufficient number of peers to tolerate bursts in request volume.
Smart contracts provide a flexible way for content providers to
influence the replication and availability of their files. Specifically,
payment policies in Smart Contracts can be easily modified to
reflect the current demands of a file. For example, a content
provider can pay more for a file during peak demand times, akin
to surge pricing with services like Uber.
Quality of Service (QoS). In addition to ensuring availability,
content providers often aim to meet certain QoS goals for
their client interactions. For example, many CDNs are judged
based on the effective download speeds and latencies they
provide [14]. In order to give content provider control on QoS,
each Blockchain record can be modified to include QoS metrics
for the corresponding chunk download, as observed by the client.
Additionally, peers can inform clients of the number of requests
they are able to handle. With this information, content providers
can factor in QoS decisions into their file placement and payment
policies (via Smart Contracts). For example, a content provider
can select a peer for a chunk download only if the predicted
download speed from the peer is high enough to support the lowest
bitrate for the video. We note that misreported QoS information by
malicious clients can be easily detected (and mitigated) by taking
into account all published QoS values for each peer.
To reduce per-chunk download delays, content providers
should also incorporate geographical proximity of clients and
peers in file placement decisions. For example, a popular file
in a region warrants the content provider to insure sufficient
peer representation of that file in the region. Content providers
can leverage the flexibility of Smart Contracts for this as well,
increasing payments to promote peers to serve files on their behalf.
Resource Efficiency. The resources that each peer provides are
not fixed or identical. Thus, file placement strategies pose a
complex resource allocation problem, particularly when multiple
files and content providers are considered. Indeed, improper
packing can lead to wasted peer storage/network resources. Chunk
sizes are a knob which content providers can use to improve
resource allocation. For example, smaller chunk sizes enable
improved packing efficiency, and also reduce the network load
on Backup Nodes that must serve the first chunk of each file.
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However, smaller chunks also increase transaction overheads on
the Blockchain, and increase the bandwidth consumed by clients
to send PoDC hashes to peers. This tradeoff implies that the
appropriate chunk size will vary across content providers.
4.2 Routing
With Gringotts, content providers send clients a list of peers
to contact for each chunk in a file. Generating this list adds
computational overhead to the content provider, who must keep
track of the set of peers that is hosting its files, and which of those
peers are alive at the time of a request. Detecting the set of live
peers at any time is relatively straightforward [8], and incorrect
listings can be handled by the Backup Node, ensuring availability.
The overheads of a centralized routing strategy motivate a
decentralized approach. However, tools for decentralization, such
as Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) [31, 18], suffer from several
challenges. First, randomizing peer selection with DHTs is diffi-
cult, since malicious nodes can directly influence routing decisions,
enabling Sybil attacks [32]. Second, discovering the peer to contact
for each chunk takes non-negligible time, harming client-perceived
QoS. Third, in many scenarios, content providers will want to
enforce routing policies that are QoS- and resource-aware (§4.1).
Adding such information into a DHT is a challenge.
5 RelatedWork
Secure Incentivization. Past incentivization strategies for P2P file-
sharing systems have focused primarily on preventing “free-riding,”
where users consume resources but do not fairly contribute them
back to the system [8, 25]. Solutions have proposed using “tit-
for-tat” mechanisms that require users to contribute resources in
exchange for service. However, early approaches could not effec-
tively prevent against malicious parties [24]. More recently, there
have been proposals to use virtual currencies to solve the free-riding
issue [33, 23, 29]. In these solutions, users are granted and debited
virtual currency for each transaction they participate in; a central
authority is responsible for verifying all transactions. However, re-
lying on a trusted central party is challenging (§1). Further, unlike
Gringotts, all of these solutions incentivize only consumers of a
service to become resource contributors, limiting adoption.
Hybrid CDNs. Many CDNs have attempted to supplement
their traditional centralized infrastructure with cheaper resources
contributed by peers [39, 38, 35, 37, 16, 13]. However, to date,
these systems have struggled with peer adoption. Further, these
approaches are not robust to attacks by malicious peers [1], and
can thus benefit from the solutions presented in Gringotts.
Reliably Proving Service. Content providers typically require
that CDNs provide statistics about client interactions. As a result,
several proposals exist for providing reliable accounting of client
transactions in hybrid CDNs. Most notably, RCA [1] requires
clients to record download statistics in tamper-evident logs [11],
which are later processed with anomaly detection algorithms.
However, RCA is only able to detect attacks in which at least one
of the two endpoints is honest (i.e., client or peer). Thus, unlike
Gringotts, RCA cannot handle the more complex collusion attacks
(e.g., Sybil attacks) that arise with monetary incentivization.
Peer-to-Peer Systems. Numerous prior systems such as
BitTorrent have motivated the potential of P2P file delivery
services [7, 15, 27, 8]. Gringotts borrows promising techniques
from these systems including policies on file placement and routing
strategies (§4). More recently, Filecoin [9] is a P2P file storage
service, which uses cyptocurrency-based incentivization to attract
peers to store files. In contrast to Gringotts which uses a “Proof
of Delivery” mechanism to verify transactions, Filecoin relies on
a “Proof of Storage” technique which cannot be directly applied
to content delivery. Moreover, Filecoin does not let third parties
(e.g., content providers) sponsor a client’s download of a file.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Conflicts with ISPs. Gringotts’s use of peer resources for content
delivery presents a tension with the goals of ISPs. In particular,
having peers serve files increases the amount of upstream traffic,
and correspondingly costs, for ISPs. However, prior work has
demonstrated that this tension can be resolved with intelligent peer
selection algorithms, in which peers within the same autonomous
system as the client are preferentially selected [5, 39]. Such a
policy can significantly reduce inter-ISP traffic, mitigating the cost
effects of peer-to-peer content delivery.
Using Gringotts. In order to use Gringotts’s content delivery ser-
vice, content providers must modify their websites or applications
to adhere to the protocols described in Section 3. For example,
web pages can use a JavaScript library to request ICs, contact
peers for chunks, and maintain (and compute hashes of) PoDCs.
This approach, in contrast to having a cross-application shim layer
running on a client’s machine, gives content providers the option
to optimize for different metrics (§4), and obviates the security
challenges associated with shared proxy solutions.
Widespread Peer Adoption. In this paper, we considered peers
to be personal computers (i.e., laptops or desktops). However,
in practice, a plethora of other devices could serve as peers,
improving performance and benefits. For example, in home
settings, continually-powered WiFi routers or IoT devices (e.g.,
security systems) could serve as reliable peers. On the opposite
end of the spectrum, colocation datacenters might deploy unused
machines as peers. Gringotts’s protocols for secure, decentralized
content delivery generalize to peers with diverse resource profiles.
Generalized Resource Sharing. Gringotts introduces several
new ideas to support decentralized, secure incentivization in
content delivery settings. However, can these ideas be applied
to more generalized resource sharing settings? A key challenge
to generalization is creating a policy which can prove that a
service-specific task was performed correctly. For example,
Gringotts requires “Proof of Delivery,” while Filecoin [9] uses
“Proof of Storage.” Similarly, clients may want to offload
GPU-based tasks to peers rather than to costly cloud services; such
a service would require “Proof of Faithful Computation.”
6
References
[1] P. Aditya, M. Zhao, Y. Lin, A. Haeberlen, P. Druschel, B.Maggs, and
B. Wishon. Reliable client accounting for p2p-infrastructure hybrids.
In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Networked Systems
Design and Implementation, pages 8–8. Usenix Association, 2012.
[2] Amazon. Amazon CloudFront – Content Delivery Network
(CDN) for Video Streaming. https://aws.amazon.com/
cloudfront/. July 14, 2018.
[3] Amazon. Amazon cloudfront pricing. https:
//aws.amazon.com/cloudfront/pricing/.
[4] N. Anjum, D. Karamshuk, M. Shikh-Bahaei, and N. Sastry.
Survey on peer-assisted content delivery networks. Comput. Netw.,
116(C):79–95, Apr. 2017.
[5] D. R. Choffnes and F. E. Bustamante. Taming the torrent: a practical
approach to reducing cross-isp traffic in peer-to-peer systems. In
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, volume 38,
pages 363–374. ACM, 2008.
[6] Cisco. Cisco visual networking index: Forecast and methodol-
ogy, 2016-2021. https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/
us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/
visual-networking-index-vni/complete-white-
paper-c11-481360.pdf. June 6, 2017.
[7] I. Clarke, O. Sandberg, B. Wiley, and T. W. Hong. Freenet: A
distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system. In
Designing privacy enhancing technologies, pages 46–66. Springer,
2001.
[8] B. Cohen. Incentives build robustness in bittorrent. InWorkshop on
Economics of Peer-to-Peer systems, volume 6, pages 68–72, 2003.
[9] Filecoin. Filecoin: A decentralized storage network.
https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf. July 19, 2017.
[10] Y. Gilad, R. Hemo, S. Micali, G. Vlachos, and N. Zeldovich.
Algorand: Scaling byzantine agreements for cryptocurrencies.
In Proceedings of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles, pages 51–68. ACM, 2017.
[11] A. Haeberlen, P. Kouznetsov, and P. Druschel. Peerreview: Practical
accountability for distributed systems. ACM SIGOPS operating
systems review, 41(6):175–188, 2007.
[12] H. S. Internet. Howmuch should i be paying for high-speed internet?
https://www.highspeedinternet.com/resources/
how-much-should-i-be-paying-for-high-speed-
internet-resource/. Mar 28, 2018.
[13] G. Kreitz and F. Niemela. Spotify–large scale, low latency, p2p
music-on-demand streaming. In Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P),
2010 IEEE Tenth International Conference on, pages 1–10. IEEE,
2010.
[14] B. Krishnamurthy, C. Wills, and Y. Zhang. On the use and
performance of content distribution networks. In Proceedings of
the 1st ACM SIGCOMMWorkshop on Internet Measurement, pages
169–182. ACM, 2001.
[15] N. Leibowitz, M. Ripeanu, and A. Wierzbicki. Deconstructing the
kazaa network. In Internet Applications. WIAPP 2003. Proceedings.
The Third IEEE Workshop on, pages 112–120. IEEE, 2003.
[16] Z. Liu, Y. Ding, Y. Liu, and K. Ross. Peer-assisted distribution of
user generated content. In Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2012
IEEE 12th International Conference on, pages 261–272. IEEE, 2012.
[17] H. Mao, R. Netravali, and M. Alizadeh. Neural Adaptive Video
Streaming with Pensieve. In Proceedings of the Conference of the
ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication, SIGCOMM
’17, pages 197–210. ACM, 2017.
[18] P. Maymounkov and D. Mazieres. Kademlia: A peer-to-peer
information system based on the xor metric. In International
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, pages 53–65. Springer, 2002.
[19] Minimatters. The best video length for different videos on
youtube. https://www.minimatters.com/youtube-
best-video-length/. Jan 23, 2017.
[20] Netflix. Internet connection speed recommendations.
https://help.netflix.com/en/node/306.
[21] Ookla. Speed test. http://www.speedtest.net/reports/
united-states/#fixed. Sep 7, 2017.
[22] peer5. Peer5 - the serverless p2p cdn for live video streaming.
https://www.peer5.com. July 10, 2018.
[23] R. S. Peterson and E. G. Sirer. Antfarm: Efficient content distribution
with managed swarms. In Proceedings of the 6th USENIX Sympo-
sium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, NSDI’09,
pages 107–122, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2009. USENIX Association.
[24] M. Piatek, T. Isdal, T. Anderson, A. Krishnamurthy, and
A. Venkataramani. Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent. In
Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems
Design &#38; Implementation, NSDI’07, pages 1–1, Berkeley, CA,
USA, 2007. USENIX Association.
[25] D. Qiu and R. Srikant. Modeling and performance analysis of
bittorrent-like peer-to-peer networks. In ACM SIGCOMM computer
communication review, volume 34, pages 367–378. ACM, 2004.
[26] D. Rayburn. Cdnmarket update: Web performance, diy, and cdn pric-
ing trends. http://www.streamingmediablog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/rayburn-cdn-pricing-
2017.pdf. May 15, 2017.
[27] M. Ripeanu. Peer-to-peer architecture case study: Gnutella network.
In Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2001. Proceedings. First International
Conference on, pages 99–100. IEEE, 2001.
[28] Sandvine. global internet phenomena-latin american & north
america.
[29] M. Sirivianos, J. H. Park, X. Yang, and S. Jarecki. Dandelion:
Cooperative content distribution with robust incentives. In 2007
USENIX Annual Technical Conference on Proceedings of the
USENIX Annual Technical Conference, ATC’07, pages 12:1–12:14,
Berkeley, CA, USA, 2007. USENIX Association.
[30] Speedtest. 2017 United States Speedtest Market Report. http:
//www.speedtest.net/reports/united-states/.
September 11, 2017.
[31] I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Karger, M. F. Kaashoek, and H. Balakr-
ishnan. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet
applications. ACM SIGCOMMComputer Communication Review,
31(4):149–160, 2001.
[32] G. Urdaneta, G. Pierre, and M. V. Steen. A survey of dht security
techniques. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 43(2):8, 2011.
[33] V. Vishnumurthy, S. Chandrakumar, and E. G. Sirer. Karma: A
secure economic framework for peer-to-peer resource sharing. In
Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, volume 35, 2003.
7
[34] G. Wood. Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction
ledger. Ethereum project yellow paper, 151:1–32, 2014.
[35] H. Yin, X. Liu, T. Zhan, V. Sekar, F. Qiu, C. Lin, H. Zhang, and
B. Li. Livesky: Enhancing cdn with p2p. ACM Trans. Multimedia
Comput. Commun. Appl., 6(3):16:1–16:19, Aug. 2010.
[36] youtube-dl developers. youtube-dl. https://rg3.github.io/
youtube-dl/. July 19, 2018.
[37] G. Zhang, W. Liu, X. Hei, and W. Cheng. Unreeling xunlei kankan:
Understanding hybrid cdn-p2p video-on-demand streaming. IEEE
Transactions on Multimedia, 17(2):229–242, 2015.
[38] Y. Zhang, C. Gao, Y. Guo, K. Bian, X. Jin, Z. Yang, L. Song,
J. Cheng, H. Tuo, and X. Li. Proactive video push for optimizing
bandwidth consumption in hybrid cdn-p2p vod systems. In IEEE
INFOCOM, 2018.
[39] M. Zhao, P. Aditya, A. Chen, Y. Lin, A. Haeberlen, P. Druschel,
B. Maggs, B. Wishon, and M. Ponec. Peer-assisted content
distribution in akamai netsession. In Proceedings of the 2013
Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, IMC ’13, pages
31–42, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
8
